Epistemic Rights and Injustice: Critical Skills for Navigating Media Messages

Image Credit: Abenomics on Pexels

By Lilian H. Hill

 

Epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, including its nature, sources, scope, and validity. It addresses fundamental questions, such as what knowledge is, how it is acquired, and how we can distinguish between justified beliefs and unfounded opinions (Audi, 2011). Epistemic rights are based on the idea that society should guarantee that all its citizens can access truthful and accurate information and have the competence to use knowledge for their own benefit and that of society. These rights are part of a broader discourse on epistemic justice (Fricker, 2007). Epistemic inequality refers to the growing divide in access to information, knowledge, and understanding between societal elites and the broader population. This divide has given rise to two contrasting regimes of truth and knowledge: one controlled and interpreted by elites, and the other, often dismissed as disinformation, fake news, or alternative truths, consumed by marginalized and disillusioned segments of society (Nieminen, 2024).

 

Epistemic rights are related to information and media literacy, which equip individuals with critical skills to evaluate sources, identify bias, and navigate complex media, thereby enabling them to exercise their epistemic and democratic rights more effectively. When people lack these literacies, they are more vulnerable to disinformation, manipulation, and epistemic injustice, such as exclusion from meaningful public discourse. Fostering strong media literacy helps promote epistemic justice by empowering individuals to participate in knowledge-sharing processes, challenge dominant narratives, and ensure diverse voices are respected in democratic societies.

 

Epistemic Injustice and Democracy

In the digital age, political media consumption is influenced not only by individual preferences but also by Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms that tailor content based on user behavior, often reinforcing ideological echo chambers (Fricker, 2007). When audiences are often exposed to uniform perspectives, marginalized voices are excluded or misrepresented (Noble, 2018). Consistent exposure to media rooted in a single ideology can lead to distorted beliefs and perceptions of others. In the absence of strong information and media literacy skills, individuals are vulnerable to misinformation and epistemic harm (Hobbs, 2021). These patterns compromise individual understanding and pose a threat to a democratic society by allowing the polarization of knowledge and weakening the informed diversity essential to its functioning.

 

Nieminen (2024) comments that democracy is experiencing a downturn across the globe. Even in nations with a longstanding tradition of democratic governance, neo-authoritarian trends are on the rise. Similar patterns have emerged in countries where governments have tightened their grip on the media, limited citizens' freedom of movement, and undermined the independence of the judiciary. While these actions are typical of autocratic regimes found on every continent, political movements with comparable agendas are also gaining traction in countries that are not officially under authoritarian rule.

 

Key Aspects of Epistemic Rights

Epistemic rights refer to the entitlements individuals have regarding their rights to access, seek, use, and share knowledge, and be respected as knowers. These rights include:

 

·      Right to be heard and believed. Individuals have the right to be respected as credible sources of knowledge within their communities and social contexts.

 

·      Right to access knowledge. This includes access to information, education, and other resources that enable individuals to become effective knowers.

 

·      Right to contribute knowledge. People should have the opportunity to participate in knowledge production and dissemination, particularly in cultural or institutional contexts that have historically excluded them.

 

·      Right to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency refers to the capacity to ask questions, offer interpretations, and assert knowledge claims. Denial of this right can occur through silencing or dismissing individuals' perspectives.

 

Examples of Epistemic Injustice

Fricker (2007) identified two primary forms of epistemic injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when a person’s word is discredited due to their race, gender, accent, or social status. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when individuals lack the language, concepts, or interpretive frameworks necessary to make sense of their own experiences. Both forms of epistemic injustice contribute to the unfair exclusion of individuals or groups from full participation in shared knowledge and understanding. The table below provides examples from the healthcare, education, and media domains that demonstrate the real-world consequences of epistemic injustice.

Confronting Epistemic Injustice

Confronting epistemic injustice requires actively challenging the systems, practices, and assumptions that silence, discredit, or marginalize individuals as knowers. This work can occur at both individual and structural levels.

 

On the individual level, it begins with acknowledging and reflecting on personal biases about who is credible or knowledgeable (Fricker, 2007). Individuals are encouraged to examine who is typically respected in their environments, including workplaces, classrooms, or social settings, and who is overlooked or doubted. Practicing epistemic humility is crucial, which involves recognizing that others may possess valuable knowledge rooted in personal or cultural experiences that differ from one's own (Dotson, 2011).

 

Actively listening to and validating the voices of marginalized individuals is another crucial step. This involves creating space for underrepresented or historically marginalized groups to share their voices, taking their accounts seriously, and seeking to understand rather than challenge their perspectives (Medina, 2013). Clarifying questions deepen understanding rather than interrogating. At the institutional and cultural levels, diversifying knowledge sources is essential. This involves integrating a range of perspectives into curricula, media, and policy, and valuing non-traditional knowledge systems, such as Indigenous, oral, or embodied knowledge, alongside academic or institutional expertise (Kovach, 2009).

 

Another important strategy is to expand language and conceptual frameworks to promote hermeneutical justice. This includes supporting the development of terminology that helps individuals articulate their experiences, such as trauma-informed or inclusive gender language, and broadening public understanding through education, advocacy, and media (Carel & Kidd, 2014). Creating inclusive decision-making spaces is also vital. Marginalized communities must be included in decisions that affect them, and these processes should be transparent so that power dynamics and the value placed on different types of knowledge can be critically assessed and adjusted.

 

Ultimately, holding institutions accountable is crucial for achieving systemic change. This involves challenging policies and practices that perpetuate testimonial injustice, such as dismissing patient complaints or discriminatory hiring practices (Crenshaw, 1991). Structural changes redistribute epistemic authority, such as implementing community advisory boards, reforming peer review processes, or adopting more inclusive research funding criteria (Harding, 1991). Together, these actions contribute to a more just and equitable distribution of knowledge and voice in society.

 

References

Audi, R. (2011). Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014). Epistemic injustice in healthcare: A philosophical analysis. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 17(4), 529–540. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241–1299.

Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press.

Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women's lives. Cornell University Press.

Kovach, M. (2009). Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and contexts. University of Toronto Press.

Nieminen, H. (2024). Why we need epistemic rights. In M. Aslama Horowitz, H. Nieminen, K. Lehtisaari, & A. D'Arma. (Eds.), Epistemic rights in the era of digital disruption. Global transformations in media and communication research (pp. 11-28). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45976-4_2